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BLENDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AT
THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS
RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE.
Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002. xxiv + 369.
Reviewed by William A. Schabas*
One of the great frustrations of both researchers and practitioners
working in the dynamic, new discipline of international criminal law is
the paucity of reference works on the subject. It is all a bit of a paradox.
Thanks to the Internet, the decisions and judgments of the two ad hoc
tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), are
available more or less in real time on the respective websites.' Compared
to even a decade ago, we are utterly spoiled in terms of our access to
information. Generous academics and NGOs are also posting early, ob-
scure material, such as the Eichmann trials and the various Nuremberg
judgments, in electronic form. Yet, in contrast with national justice sys-
tems, where detailed and rigorous textbooks signpost the way to relevant
precedents, international criminal law seems starved for the textbooks
and law reports that most jurists were weaned on in law schools.
How welcome, then, is a true "textbook" on evidence before interna-
tional criminal tribunals. The authors are Judge Richard May, now a
judge on the ICTY, but an old hand at writing classic "textbooks" in the
English common law system from which he originates, and Marieke
Wierda, a Dutch lawyer who worked with Judge May at the ad hoc tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia and who is now employed by the New
York-based International Centre for Transitional Justice. International
Criminal Evidence fills a gaping void in the literature, and its publication
will be welcomed by lawyers, scholars, and students alike.
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, who edits the Transnational Publish-
ers series in international and comparative criminal law to which the
book belongs, introduces the volume. He notes that fairness remains cen-
tral,2 and indeed it is an overarching concern of the authors. An
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1. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.un.org/
icty; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://www.ictr.org.
2. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Foreword to JUDGE RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, at xiii (2002).
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important chapter in this volume is entitled "Fair Trial Rights."3 The
book even strays a bit from the precise parameters of evidentiary issues
to talk about more strictly procedural questions such as delay.4 But it is
all part of an editorial philosophy, and a rather remarkable evolution
from the post-World War II proceedings where fairness and "equality of
arms" were not so close to the core of the international agenda. As the
authors note, it is the development of international human rights stan-
dards, and their interpretation in the case law of such bodies as the
European Court of Human Rights, that account for the evolution.5
The discussion of fair trial issues begins with a helpful nod to the
Justice Case, at which Nazi judges and prosecutors were convicted of
crimes against humanity for the offense of, essentially, administering
justice.6 Dutiful positivists, they had argued in defense that they were
there to apply the law, and not to rule on its wisdom or fairness. They
even pledged to do the same in post-war Germany, and aside from those
who were indicted at Nuremberg, many of them managed to do precisely
that. As May and Wierda recall, the Nazi jurists were found guilty be-
cause they had denied the right of the defense to introduce evidence, as
well as being responsible for a range of procedural abuses.'
One of the first rulings of the ICTY concerned evidentiary matters
and fundamental rights. In Tadic, the Trial Chamber rejected defense
arguments based upon a precedent of the European Court of Human
Rights, noting that the ICTY was "in certain respects, comparable to a
military tribunal, which often has limited rights of due process and more
lenient rules of evidence."' May and Wierda do not take issue with this
troublesome statement, but they do quarrel with the ratio of the judg-
ment, and take sides with dissenting judge Ninian Stephen, who found
the majority to be too prosecution-friendly. 9
The discussion by the authors of evidentiary issues adheres to a pat-
tern, beginning with what are called the "historical trials" (Nuremberg,
Tokyo, and related proceedings), and then the "modern trials" (the ad
hoc tribunals) followed by a discussion of the law of the International
3. RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 259-98
(2002).
4. Id. at 273-75, 278-80.
5. Id. at 265-66.
6. Id. at 259.
7. Id.; see United States v. Alstotter, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, 6 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (1948) (Justice Case). This case is publicly known as the factual
underpinnings of the film JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (United Artists 1961).
8. Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1 -T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, para. 28 (Aug. 10, 1995), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/icty.
9. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 3, at 283.
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Criminal Court. Considerable reliance is placed on the case law of the
ICTR, an important body of law that specialists and commentators too
often overlook. There is also much insight into the teachings and experi-
ence of the early cases, like the Justice Case,' the High Command Case"
and Eichmann.'2 The evidentiary issues that were developed by these
pioneering decisions are not well known, and the volume helpfully
brings them to our attention.
The authors are both alive to and intrigued by the cultural dimension
of the law of evidence, noting how two of the world's principal legal tra-
ditions-the English common law and what is sometimes called the
"civil law," derived from Napoleon's codifications-have intermarried."
They might even have pushed this a bit further, speculating on how the
tribunals have diverged from this in some respects. There is a brief dis-
cussion about why the evidentiary file, prepared by the prosecutor, is not
admissible at trial. In the "civil law" system, an investigating judge's
dossier of evidence comprises the starting point for judges at the trial
stage, whereas under the common law, there is essentially nothing on the
record when the hearing actually begins. May and Wierda state simply
that "the Trial Chambers have not adopted a civil law approach."" Yet the
ICTR, in Akayesu, tried to do precisely this, ordering production of the
material that had earlier been presented to the defense as part of the dis-
closure procedure."
A final chapter entitled "Trends in International Criminal Evidence"
peers into the future, inevitably with an eye to the International Criminal
Court, whose establishment essentially coincides with the publication of
this important volume. The authors conclude that international criminal
evidence, and probably international criminal law generally, is character-
ized by an adversarial framework. In other words, the common law has
triumphed over the "civil law" in this respect. Yet May and Wierda also
set this alongside a philosophy of liberal admissibility standards that is
unquestionably derived from la liberti de la preuve of the "civil law"
tradition.'6
There are some mysteries that remain to be unravelled, although this
book certainly provides elements of a solution. For example, although
the issue of privilege has been addressed by the ad hoc tribunals (with
10. Alstotter, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS.
11. United States v. von Leeb, 10 & 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (1949).
12. A.G. Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. Isr. 1962), A.G. Israel v. Eichmann,
36 I.L.R. 18 (Dist. Ct. Jm. 1961).
13. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 3, at 18.
14. Id.
15. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, para. 41 (Sept. 2, 1998),
available at http://www.ictr.org.
16. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 3, at 335.
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respect to workers in humanitarian organizations and war correspon-
dents), a general framework of analysis has yet to be fleshed out by
either tribunal. The Rules of the International Criminal Court provide
judges with guidelines, indicating that to be privileged, communication
must be made in the course of a confidential relationship producing a
reasonable expectation of privacy and nondisclosure, be essential to the
nature and type of relationship between the person and the confidant,
and be in furtherance of the objectives of the Statute and the Rules. 7
This obviously applies to doctors and probably to priests, but might it
not also fit with confidential testimony given to a truth and reconciliation
commission? Future judges will furnish us with the answers, but almost
surely not without first consulting May and Wierda for guidance.
Another evidentiary enigma in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court concerns so-called national security information. May
and Wierda are right to note that the last word on whether or not such
evidence will be produced falls to the State, in contrast with the situation
before the new International Criminal Court. Indeed, it was in reaction to
a bold ruling of the ICTY Appeals Chamber setting out the terms and
conditions under which States might be compelled to produce materials
that they considered to affect national security8 that the delegations as-
sembled at the Rome Conference sought out a more State-friendly norm.
The result is a provision by which a Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Court can "make such inference in the trial of the accused as to
the existence or non-existence of a fact, as may be appropriate in the cir-
cumstances."' 9 In other words, a person can be acquitted or convicted on
the basis of."evidence" that does not actually exist!
Evidentiary rulings are made by trial judges, generally as interlocu-
tory decisions, and rarely get appealed. This was the case with the
ICTY's first evidentiary judgment, in Tadic, on anonymous witnesses. A
judgment rendered the same day on the question of jurisdiction went on
to become one of the defining precedents in international criminal law,2°
17. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, R. 73, U.N.
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/docs/rules(e).pdf.
18. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14, Judgement on the Request of the
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (Oct. 29,
1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty. On the drafting of article 72 of the Rome Statute,
see Donald K. Piragoff, Protection of National Security Information, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS
270, 274 (Roy Lee ed., 1999).
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17
July 1998, arts. 72(7)(a)(iii), 72(7)(b)(ii), U.N. Doc. A/CONE183/9.
20. Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94- 1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
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while the Trial Chamber's upsetting pronouncement about military tri-
bunals remained unchallenged, like a hair floating on a bowl of soup.
Thankfully, the authors note that the ruling has not been followed subse-
quently,2' either by the Prosecutor or the Trial Chambers, an important
fact that is unfortunately not known widely enough among scholars. Too
many students of ICTY case law still look upon that early decision as a
statement of good law.
One of the rare judgments of the Appeals Chamber dealing with evi-
dence involved alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and resulted in a ruling
granting a stay of proceedings and discharge of the accused, against
whom there were serious and credible accusations of participation in
genocide. Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber agreed to revise its contro-
versial. decision, but in order to justify this it agreed to admit new
evidence that was almost surely available to the Prosecutor much earlier,
had she shown the requisite diligence. A troubling precedent was cre-
ated, full of potential for mischief by attorneys on either side of the
divide.23 May and Wierda sagely discredit the Appeals Chamber prece-
dent as the product of "wholly exceptional circumstances,"2 rather than
attempting to fit it within a coherent framework of principles to guide the
admissibility of new evidence.
Obviously this is not a book for relaxed bedside reading, and will
generally be treated by its professional and academic audience more as a
reference work than as a monograph. Good indexes are essential to
unlocking the rich material in a volume of this sort, and more effort
might have been invested in this respect. This may be more the responsi-
bility of the publishers than of the authors. The table of cases is a bit
odd, as it proceeds by name of defendant, such as Tadic, Barayagwiza,
and so on, although there may be more than one relevant decision on
evidentiary matters for any given individual. Some cases are listed dif-
ferently: Eichmann is placed under "Attorney-General" and Finta under
R. (for ."Regina" or "The Queen"). I had trouble finding certain topics in
the index. There is nothing under "sexual crimes" (although there is an
entry for "rape"), nor any entry for "DNA evidence" or "child wit-
nesses." There is no bibliography or table of legislation.
International Criminal Evidence becomes immediately the standard
work on this subject. Carefully researched, thorough and methodical, it
responds to a genuine need. Thankfully, it is much more than a catalogue
21. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 3, at 283.
22. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision (Nov. 3, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.ictr.org.
23. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, ICTR Case No. ICTR-97-19, Prosecutor's Request
for Review or Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://www.ictr.org.
24. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 3, at 317.
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of relevant cases. There is much thought and insight in this volume about
the principles that underpin the rules, the philosophy they express, and
the many important matters that remain unresolved. There is much to
guide the judges of the International Criminal Court, who in turn will
develop the law. Their work will inexorably dictate that May and Wierda
begin work on a second edition in this fast changing field.
